The first systematic philosophers in the Chinese tradition, Mozi and his followers established a general theoretical orientation, conceptual framework, and technical philosophical vocabulary that came to be widely shared throughout pre-Han philosophy, even by thinkers who rejected their substantive views. Mohist thought thus exemplifies characteristic general features of early Chinese metaphysics and in several key respects sets the agenda for the development of classical Chinese metaphysical discourse. This essay will elucidate these points by articulating the conception of reality that emerges from the doctrines concerning the "Three Models" (san fa ), tian (heaven), and ming (fate) presented in the core books of the Mozi and by exploring the metaphysical, metaethical, and epistemological consequences of these doctrines.
Introduction
The first systematic philosophers in the Chinese tradition, Mozi and his followers established a general theoretical orientation, conceptual framework, and technical philosophical vocabulary that came to be widely shared throughout pre-Han philosophy, even by thinkers who rejected their substantive views. Mohist thought thus exemplifies characteristic general features of early Chinese metaphysics and in several key respects sets the agenda for the development of classical Chinese metaphysical discourse. This essay will elucidate these points by articulating the conception of reality that emerges from the doctrines concerning the "Three Models" (san fa ), tian (heaven), and ming (fate) presented in the core books of the Mozi and by exploring the metaphysical, metaethical, and epistemological consequences of these doctrines. 1 For the Mohists, reality is reliably knowable through sense perception, inference, and historical precedent. It manifests fixed, recognizable patterns. Ethical norms are a humanindependent feature of reality, and indeed nature itself operates according to the same ethical norms that apply to human activity. Thus the Mohist dao (way) is purportedly the dao of reality itself, grounded in tried and tested knowledge of the world. Still, although the cosmos follows a normative dao, the outcomes of human personal and political life are not preordained. Human agency plays an important causal role in affecting the course of events, as agents are free to follow or diverge from the dao of nature. For students of comparative philosophy, perhaps the most striking feature of Mohist metaphysics is its theoretical focus on dao rather than on structures or properties. Mohist metaphysical thought is concerned primarily with identifying norms, patterns, and processes rather than with explaining the natures of things or the underlying composition or principles that constitute them as what they are. This point will emerge repeatedly as we examine different facets of the Mohist conception of reality.
The first section below suggests four respects in which the Mohist view of reality exemplifies what came to be shared general features of pre-Qin metaphysical discourse: the Mohists' naturalism, their focus on dao, their acceptance of the world of perception, and their lack of interest in reductive explanations. The next section explores the view of reality implied by the epistemological doctrine of the "Three Models." The following two sections discuss Mohist views on several specifically metaphysical topics: tian (heaven), ghosts and spirits, and ming (fate). Finally, I offer some reflections on the metaphysical significance of the concept of a "model" (fa ), which is pivotal to understanding Mohist ethics, psychology, epistemology, and, I argue, metaphysics.
Mohism and Early Chinese Metaphysics
Four central features of early Mohist thought reflect general characteristics of classical Chinese metaphysics.
First, the Mozi presents the earliest explicit version of what I will call Chinese metaphysical and metaethical "naturalism." The brand of naturalism I am referring to here involves two interrelated claims. One is that reality just is the world of nature and observable natural phenomena, and accordingly whatever exists is to be explained as part of nature.
Ultimate reality is not an abstract realm of ideal forms, nor one of a supernatural, transcendent deity or spirits. Instead, it is simply "the stuff of people's ears and eyes," as the Mozi phrases it (35/9). 2 This conception of reality as the observable natural world has been widely shared by thinkers throughout the Chinese tradition.
The second claim is that the dao (way, course, ethical norms) is a feature of the natural world, in some sense immanent in or determined by nature itself. Again, thinkers throughout the Chinese tradition have attempted in various ways to ground ethical norms in nature. The Mohist version of this idea is that the dao is exemplified and embodied by tian (heaven, nature), which they revere as a quasi-personal nature-deity. This religious stance may seem at odds with the claim that for them reality is simply the empirical world of sense perception. However, for the Mohists tian just is a semi-personified conception of nature-in effect, "Nature" with a capital "N." Although their conception of nature is what we might call, borrowing the Weberian notion, an "enchanted" one, tian for them still refers to nature, and not, for instance to a deity that transcends or exists beyond the natural world. In their view, then, dao is manifested in how nature itself proceeds. Natural processes reflect or embody ethical norms-severe storms, for instance, are tian's punishment for people's failure to conform to its intent . This stance is continuous with the earlier, Zhou dynasty doctrine of tian's mandate (tian ming ), according to which tian enforces ethical norms by bestowing its mandate on virtuous rulers and sanctioning the overthrow of vicious ones. Scattered remarks in the Confucian Analects also allude to tian as a moral force.
Only in the Mozi, however, is this moralized conception of nature fully developed and integrated with normative ethical theory.
The second major feature can be described as a "dao-centered conceptual framework." By this I mean that the notion of dao (way), a normative path or course of activity, stands at the heart of the Mohist philosophical framework, shaping its overall orientation and the content of its core concepts. In making this claim, I am building on seminal ideas proposed by A. C. Graham and Chad Hansen more than two decades ago.
Graham aptly suggested that for early Chinese thinkers, the crucial philosophical question is not "What is the truth?" but "Where is the Way?"-the proper dao by which to govern society and conduct one's personal life (1989: 3). Hansen (1992) Since such questions about dao do not revolve around issues of composition or constitution, they do not invite explanations that reduce reality to basic parts or structures.
These features of the Mohist theoretical scheme set the agenda for much classical In what follows, I will explore how the features and issues identified in this section are reflected in Mohist doctrines concerning the "Three Models" (san fa), nature or heaven (tian), and fate or destiny (ming). I will then explain how several strands of Mohist metaphysical thought are woven together by the pivotal concept of a "model" or "standard"
(fa).

Reality in Early Mohism: Epistemic Hints
The epistemic methods a philosopher endorses often have implications for that thinker's view of reality. This observation is particularly apposite to the Mohists, who introduce their epistemic doctrine of the "Three Models" (san fa ) specifically to treat a metaphysical issue, the existence of destiny or fate (ming). The content and application of the Three Models help to illustrate the Mohists' conception of reality and their general metaphysical orientation.
The doctrine of the Three Models presents three "models" or "standards" (fa) by which to "clearly distinguish" (ming bian ) action-guiding "statements" or "teachings"
(yan ) as "right or not" (shi fei ) or as bringing "benefit or harm" (li hai ) (Mozi 35/6-10). As an example of such a statement, the text cites the claim that "If fated to be wealthy, people are wealthy; if fated to be poor, they are poor…Given fate, even if one works
hard, of what advantage is it?" (35/3-4). Statements influence conduct: those who affirm the existence of fate and accept this teaching presumably will not strive to improve their economic circumstances. So the issue for the Mohists is how to distinguish whether such action-guiding statements are "right" and are thus a guideline to the proper dao.
The "Three Models" are that statements must have a "root" (ben ), a "source"
(yuan ), and a "use" (yong ). 6 The "root" is the historical precedent and evidence provided by the deeds of the ancient sage-kings, moral exemplars who reliably distinguished right from wrong correctly and whose dao we thus seek to follow. The "source" is that statements must have an empirical basis: they must be checked against the "reality" or "stuff"
(shi ) of people's ears and eyes, or what anyone can see and hear. The "use" is that when adopted as a basis for punishment and government administration, the statement must produce benefit (li) for the state, clan, and people. The Mohists explain the function of these three models by analogy to measuring tools or guidelines, such as the wheelwright's compass or the carpenter's set square. To determine whether a corner is square, a carpenter checks it against a set square to see if the two are similar or "match" (zhong ). Analogously, statements or teachings that "match" the three standards are judged right (shi) and beneficial (li) and are thus to be promulgated and acted on. Those that fail to match them are "wrong"
(fei) and "harmful" (hai) and thus are to be discouraged and rejected as guides to conduct. In repudiating fatalism, for example, the Mohists argue that first, historical examples of the ancient sage-kings' deeds show that security and order depend on government policy, not fate: the sage-kings achieved peace and security under the same social conditions in which the tyrants brought turmoil and danger. Second, no one has ever actually seen or heard fate.
Third, fatalism has detrimental social consequences, since if people believe that success or failure are predestined, they will not exert effort to improve their moral or economic circumstances. Statements that assume the existence of fate thus fail to match any of the models. Hence gentlemen committed to the right dao-those who wish "all the world" to be wealthy and orderly-cannot fail to reject "the statements of those who hold fate exists," as these are "great harm to the world" (Mozi 35/46-47).
The epistemic stance of the Three Models directly reflects the Mohists' practical focus on ethical and political dao, rather than on explaining or analyzing the fundamental constitution or nature of things. The purpose of the models is not to identify or explain the structure of reality, but to distinguish which teachings or dicta (yan) are suitable candidates for "regularly" (chang ) guiding action. 7 The third model-utility as an ethical and administrative policy-especially illustrates this practical emphasis. Moreover, the Three Models jointly imply that reality is readily knowable through perceptual observation, 
Tian and Reality
The Mozi offers the first explicit theory in the Chinese tradition of tian or nature as embodying ethical norms. Earlier historical texts, such as the "Announcement of the Duke of Shao" (Shao Gao ) and other documents collected in the Shang Shu , depict tian as requiring that a sovereign meet certain norms of conduct as a condition for receiving its continued mandate to rule. Only in the Mozi, however, do we find an explicit conception of tian as a paradigm and enforcer of the proper ethical dao-namely, for the Mohists, the dao of promoting the "benefit of all the world."
Tian in the Mozi is an object of religious reverence and worship, conceptually a blend of a quasi-personal deity and the forces of nature. In Classical Chinese, the word "tian" refers to the sky or to nature, and these referents partly constitute the content of the Mohist In exploring the implications of these beliefs, we should keep in mind that tian refers not only to a sky god but to nature or the natural world as a whole. nature itself manifests agency and follows what they take to be the correct dao. My hypothesis, then, is that the Mohists' confidence that the world is causally regular, that perception reliably indicates reality, and that pragmatically useful distinctions are real is explained by their providential conception of tian, which created and maintains a natural environment that follows a "regular" (chang) dao which facilitates constructive, beneficial human activity.
Of course, since for the Mohists the natural world includes ghosts, spirits, and deities, from a contemporary standpoint their conception of nature is supernatural, not naturalistic.
Still, their stance can be considered naturalistic in a loose sense, insofar as the supernatural components of the Mohist worldview are in their eyes either denizens of the natural world, such as ghosts and spirits, or nature personified, namely tian. These components of their conception of reality refer only to what they consider parts of nature and not, for instance, to divine beings that transcend the natural world or abstract entities that subsist beyond it.
Moreover, there is a fairly obvious way that the Mohist worldview can be stripped of its supernatural elements and secularized or naturalized in the contemporary sense of the term. The Mohists' conception of yi (right)-the dao they attribute to tian-is for human society and all of its members to support the "benefit of all the world." This dao can be regarded as an ethical extension of our innate, natural disposition to pursue our own utility or flourishing. The Mohists in effect claim that the dao of nature as a whole is to facilitate the benefit or flourishing of all of us who live within nature. 9 As members of what we might call "the community of nature," they would maintain, we ought to follow this dao, which amounts to an impartial, collective version of our spontaneous disposition to seek our own individual benefit and that of our immediate circle of kin. The Mohists' implied stance is that such a dao of jointly acting to further the benefit of all is also natural in being a feasible candidate for a "regular" dao, one that can be followed constantly and universally, much as a natural pattern or a law of nature can. This dao taps into our natural dispositions and builds on the regular causal connections between beneficial practices and their results.
Such a secularized version of the Mohist dao may well be prima facie defensible.
Much natural, spontaneous activity probably is indeed directed by the action-guiding distinction between benefit and harm, and the Mohist attempt to universalize this distinction into an ethical dao is in some respects appealing. Of course, a contemporary Mohist would probably find it difficult to convincingly justify the argumentative step from a descriptive conception of nature's dao as facilitating everyone's pursuit of benefit to the normative conclusion that we should collectively follow a dao of promoting the benefit of all. Also, on reflection, it seems clear that benefit-versus-harm is not really a "regular" or "constant" action-guiding distinction in the sense the Mohists seek. Although it surely falls among the distinctions by which we justifiably guide action, it is hardly the only one, nor does it apply in every case. Other action-guiding distinctions that are arguably equally "natural" include just/unjust, beautiful/ugly, and enjoyable/unenjoyable, to give only a few examples.
Moreover, the Mohists' stance about the naturalness and "constancy" of the dao of furthering the benefit of all the world quickly loses plausibility when we consider the narrowness of their conception of benefit, which includes only material prosperity, social order, and a flourishing population. Even if benefit/harm were our chief action-guiding distinction, benefit for most of us is broader than just these three basic goods, and there is little reason to expect we could converge on any richer yet sufficiently specific conception of benefit.
Rejection of Fatalism
Another important facet of the Mohist conception of reality is their rejection of fatalism or predestination, expressed through their denial of the existence of ming (fate/destiny). For some early Confucian thinkers, the doctrine of ming provided a potential response to the problem of natural evil. Why do worthy people sometimes live difficult, materially unsuccessful lives? One explanation of undeserved misfortune might be that material outcomes are ultimately beyond even a virtuous agent's control. Perhaps events are sometimes determined by ming, or fate, regardless of the course of action an agent undertakes. As the Mohists interpret this idea, to affirm the existence of ming is to claim that material outcomes such as wealth, population, social order, and longevity are all fated, rendering human effort powerless to improve them (35/3-4).
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As we have seen, the Mohists' explicit argument against this doctrine is that it runs contrary to the Three Models. More fundamentally, however, a belief in fate or predestination as they understand it is deeply incompatible with their moralized conception of nature. If the proper dao is to promote the benefit of all, and if tian or nature conforms to and enforces this ethical norm, then reality must be arranged such that promoting benefit is within our power, moral worth is rewarded, and viciousness is punished. A world in which the worthy suffered misfortune, the vicious prospered, or rewards and punishments were dispensed for outcomes issue from multiple causal factors, some of which may be difficult to identify and control.
Our Master Mozi was ill. Die Bi went in and asked, "Sir, you take the ghosts and spirits to be sentient and able to bring calamity or blessings. Those who do good they reward; those who do wrong they punish. Now you, sir, are a sage. Why are you ill? Could it be that your teaching has errors, and the ghosts and spirits are not sentient?" Our master Mozi said, "Even supposing I am ill, how is it that they are not sentient? There are many ways people can catch an illness. Some get ill from the cold or heat, some from exhaustion. If there are a hundred doors and you close one of them, how is it that a burglar has no way in?" According to the passage, the existence of natural evil does not disprove the Mohist doctrine of sentient ghosts and spirits who enforce ethical norms. Evils such as illness may occur without the spirits' punishment and despite their rewards, since their intervention is but one of many causally relevant factors. All these factors are in principle intelligible, although perhaps not always practically manageable. The key to avoiding misfortune lies in human effort, in working harder to identify and protect against risks.
Still, we might ask, why don't tian and the spirits protect the worthy person from these other potential causes of misfortune? Here I suggest the Mohist answer lies in the quasinaturalistic character of tian's agency. In the Mohist worldview, tian generally does not intervene proactively in human activity to prevent adverse outcomes. Its agency is mainly reactive, along the lines of natural causal regularities. Other things being equal, if we follow tian's intent-the normative dao of nature-tian and the ghosts will respond by facilitating our endeavors. If we diverge from tian's intent, they will not proactively stop us but will merely ensure that harmful consequences ensue. For example, in the Mohist worldview, tian beneficently provides materials by which we can build sturdy buildings. Despite this benevolence, if we recklessly decide to jump off a roof, tian will not intervene to restrain us, and when we do jump, it will cause us to fall. Similarly, in the Mohist interpretation of history, tian does not intervene to prevent wicked tyrants from misgoverning their states and harming their people. Once they do so, however, it responds by punishing them and supporting challengers who depose them. We have seen that tian plays a core role in the Mohist worldview. A crucial detail of this worldview is that the Mohists explicitly take tian's intent to be a model (fa) analogous to the wheelwright's compass or the carpenter's set square (27/73). The concept of fa is thus conceptually central to the Mohist theoretical framework. Besides the compass and square, the full list of paradigmatic fa includes the string line, plumb bob, and water level (4/2-3).
All of these tools function as reliable paradigms or guidelines by which to distinguish whether objects are round, square, straight, and so forth in order to achieve practical ends-as when we compare a curved edge with the arc of the compass to check whether it forms a usable wheel. As the use of fa illustrates, in their epistemology, their ethics, and also their metaphysics, the Mohists are concerned with agents' ability to distinguish kinds of things for practical purposes by comparing them to standards or benchmarks that need not themselves be the kind of thing in question. (The compass itself is not round, nor is a water level itself flat and level.) Fa do not purport to capture the constitution, structure, or essence of things; they are merely handy references used to check for relations of similarity and difference and hence to draw distinctions. In proposing various fa to guide action, then, the Mohists are not offering definitions of properties such as "round" or "square" or attempting to explain these features by appeal to basic principles. Nor do they imply that the compass or set square present the essence or abstract form of roundness or squareness. Their project is not to describe or capture fundamental structure or composition. It is simply to find reliable models by which to draw distinctions that produce useful outcomes-houses that are sturdy and warm, carriages that are strong and roll smoothly, tables that are solid and level. This intellectual orientation is one aspect of their dao-centered conceptual framework-they are concerned with practical norms for carrying out concrete projects. Another way to characterize their outlook might be to say that they adopt an engineering orientation rather than a theoretical one. Instead of an accurate theoretical explanation or analysis of reality, What explains why some things match the model while others do not? Early Mohist writings never address such questions. 13 Even the Later Mohist dialectical texts give only the simplest of answers: "stuffs" or "solids" (shi ) that match a model are "similar" (tong ) or "of a kind" (lei ) by virtue of sharing some similar feature, such their "shape" (xing ) (see Fraser 2005 Fraser , 2013 . Even for the Later Mohist logicians, the task of inquiry is simply to identify the proper dao by which to distinguish similar from dissimilar things, with the aid of whatever models or criteria might prove useful. The theoretical role of the concept of fa thus epitomizes the anti-reductionist, anti-essentialist tendencies in Mohist thought and the Mohists' concern with practical dao rather than questions of structure, composition, or essence. Models are a guide to following dao, and what follows the sage-kings' precedent, agrees with what we see and hear, and yields practical benefit is dao. Once we have learned how to apply the models to identify the dao, no further metaphysical questions are pertinent.
A providential tian has created the world such that distinctions that conform to the Three Models-and thus produce round wheels, square corners, bountiful harvests, and orderly societies-are real and are the dao of nature, the dao that tian itself follows.
Concluding Remarks
The 3 What we consider supernatural elements of the Mohist worldview, such as ancestral ghosts and the spirits of rivers and mountains, are in their view observable inhabitants of the natural world. The nature-deity tian may not be directly observable itself, but the results of its agency are, including the spirit-envoys by which it purportedly conveys messages to humanity.
4 Accordingly, they are also unworried by skepticism about the world of sense perception. For more on this general feature of early Chinese thought, see Fraser (2011a) .
5 On this point, compare Franklin Perkins's suggestion elsewhere in this volume that in early Chinese thought, the identity of wu (things) is explained mainly by their "shapes"
and not, for instance, by appeal to their nature or essence or by reduction to their parts or the qi from which they are constituted.
6 For bevity, I will consider only the first of the three versions of the doctrine in the Mozi (35/6-10). 7 The Mohists hold that explicit statements or teachings (yan ) can provide guidance in following the dao. They strive to identify yan that provide "constant" or "regular" (chang ) guidance-that is, yan that have consistent, universal applicability. For the importance of such yan, see Mozi 46/37-38 and 47/18-19. 8 The Classical Chinese word "tian " refers primarily to the sky. It is also the name of the Zhou Dynasty sky-god, whom the Mohists revere. In the compound "tian-di " it is paired with "di," the word for earth, to refer to the natural world. When contrasted with "ren " (human), it refers to nature or natural features. In contexts referring to the origin of things or to their inborn features, it is interpretable roughly as "nature." In such contexts, it contrasts with the products of human culture or acquired traits.
9 To us, it may seem that such a dao should include the benefit of non-human creatures as well, but the Mohists' ethical concern extends only to humans. 10 The Mozi does not consider the alternative view that although agents' actions might affect outcomes, the amount and efficiency of their effort are determined by fate.
11 Paraphrased this way, the Mohist position might seem too strong, as perhaps a coherent consequentialism requires only that certain courses of action usually or probably produce better or worse results, not that they invariably do. However, the Mohists themselves seem to regard the doctrine of ming as sundering any regular causal connection between one's conduct and its outcome, thus making good or bad consequences highly unpredictable.
See, for instance, passages such as 35/30-36, which implies that according to the doctrine of ming, rewards and punishments are completely detached from worthy or vicious conduct. I thank the editors for prompting me to clarify this point.
12 See Fraser (2002) , (2005), (2011b), and (2013).
13 Partly this is a matter of genre. Early Mohist texts mainly treat ethical, social, and political issues, not metaphysical or ontological topics.
